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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN.§

78-2-2(3) (j) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AS TO DEFENDANT LARSON

1.

Whether the Defendant Larson was a member of the Moab

Land Development Joint Venture, as alleged in the First Amended
Complaint, and, if so, whether Defendant Larson breached any of
the terms of the Joint Venture Agreement.
Standard

of Review:

The grant of a motion for summary

judgment is reviewed for correctness.
C Trucking,
2.

Inc.,

Surety

Underwriters

v.

E&

10 P.3d 338, 340 (Utah 2000).

Whether the Defendant Larson is liable to the

Plaintiffs in any amount as the result of his execution of a
promissory note in favor of third parties.
Standard

of Review:

The grant of a motion for summary

judgment is reviewed for correctness.
C Trucking,
3.

Inc.,

10 P.3d 338, 340

Surety Underwriters

v. E &

(Utah 2000).

Whether the Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages

relates solely to a claim for alleged breach of contract and is
thus not allowable as a matter of law.

1

Standard

of Review:

The grant of a motion for summary

judgment is reviewed for correctness.
C Trucking,

4.

Inc.

Surety

Underwriters

v. E &

, 10 P.3d 338, 340 (Utah 2000).

Whether the Defendant Larson is equitably estopped from

denying his membership in the Moab Land Development Joint
Venture, and equitably estopped from denying any liability under
a trust deed note he executed in favor of third parties.
Standard

of Review:

This issue is reviewable for an abuse of

the District Court's broad discretion.
Parker

v.

Associates

5.

Irizarry,
v.

See, e.g., State

945 P.2d 676, 682 (Utah 1997); Trolley

Nielson,

ex

rel.
Square

886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) .

Whether the District Court erred in refusing to allow

the Plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint.
Standard

of Review:

The Court reviews the District Court's

refusal to allow an amended pleading for an abuse of discretion.
Fishbaugh

v.

Utah Power

& Light,

969 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1998) .

APPLICABLE STATUTES
The following statutes may be of significant importance in
assisting the Court in deciding this appeal:

2

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 48-1-3.1. Joint venture defined —

Application of chapter.
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners of a single business
enterprise.
(2)
This chapter governs the property and
transfer rights of joint venturers.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 48-1-13. Partner

by

estoppel.

(1) When a person by words spoken or written or by
conduct represents himself, or consents to another's
representing him, to any one as a partner, in an existing
partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners,
he is liable to any such person to whom such representation
has been made who has on the faith of such representation
given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and, if
he has made such representation or consented to its being
made in a public manner, he is liable to such person,
whether the representation has or has not been made or
communicated to such person so giving credit by, or with the
knowledge of, the apparent partner making the representation
or consenting to its being made.
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is
liable as if he were an actual member of the
partnership.
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is
liable jointly with the other persons, if any, so
consenting to the contract or representation as to
incur liability; otherwise, separately.
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a
partner in an existing partnership, or with one or more
persons not actual partners, he is an agent of the persons
consenting to such representation to bind them to the same
extent and in the same manner as though he were a partner in
fact, with respect to persons who rely upon the
representation. Where all the members of an existing
partnership consent to the representation, a partnership act
or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the
joint act or obligation of the person acting and the persons
consenting to the representation.

3

UTAH CODE A N N . § 48-1-15. Rules

duties

of

determining

rights

and

partners.

The rights and duties of the partners in relation to
the partnership shall be determined, subject to any
agreement between them, by the following rules:
(1)

Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether
by way of capital or advances to the partnership
property, and share equally in the profits and surplus
remaining after all liabilities, including those to
partners, are satisfied; and, except as provided in
Subsection 48-1-12(2), must contribute towards the
losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by
the partnership according to his share in the profits.

(2)

The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect
of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably
incurred by him in the ordinary and proper conduct of
its business, or for the preservation of its business
or property.

(3)

A partner who in aid of the partnership makes any
payment or advance beyond the amount of capital which
he agreed to contribute shall be paid interest from the
date of the payment or advance.

(4)

A partner shall receive interest on the capital
contributed by him only from the date when repayment
should be made.

(5)

All partners have equal rights in the management and
conduct of the partnership business.

(6)

No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in
the partnership business, except that a surviving
partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his
services in winding up the partnership affairs.

(7)

No person can become a member of a partnership without
the consent of all the partners.

(8)

Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected
with the partnership business may be decided by a
majority of the partners; but no act in contravention
of any agreement between the partners may be done
rightfully without the consent of all the partners.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, This is an appeal from the District

Court's grant of summary judgment on the issues raised in the
Complaint, and from the District Court's ruling denying the
Plaintiffs' two motions to file a second amended Complaint.
B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below.

The

Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint in this case on
September 18, 1998 (R. at 1 ) ; and named as defendants therein
Defendant Arnold; Defendant Larson; Duane R. Barney; Peter Lanto;
Eric A. Rasmussen; and Gregory A. Page.

Following discovery by

the parties, and pursuant to the Court!s Orders filed November 3
and November 10, 19991, the Plaintiffs filed their First Amended
Complaint more than one year later, on November 9, 1999 (R. at
216), naming as defendants only Defendant Arnold and Defendant
Larson.
Defendant Arnold filed a motion for partial summary judgment
with respect to the First Cause of Action ("Breach of Joint
Venture Agreement") ; with respect to the Third Cause of Action
("Breach of Fiduciary Duty vs. Defendant Arnold1'); and with
respect to the Fourth Cause of Action ("Punitive Damages") on or
about May 30, 2000.

(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 3; R. at 361.)

That motion was granted as to the Third and Fourth Causes of

1

It appears the Court entered two orders because the first
order, filed November 3, 1999, was not served on Defendant
Larson.
5

Action by the District Court in its Order of August 15, 2000.2
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 7; R. at 779.)
The case was set for trial on August 28, 2000.
after commencement of

Shortly

trial, however, the District Court

declared a mistrial which is not at issue on this appeal.
of Appellant, Addendum 12; R. at 962.)

(Brief

Following the mistrial

and various evidentiary rulings by the District Court, the
Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a second amended complaint on
September 1, 2000.

(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 13; R. at 971.)

Prior to the Court's ruling on that motion, the Plaintiffs filed
a "Motion to Further Amend Complaint" on September 25, 2000.
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 16; R. at 1019.)

Both motions to

amend were denied by the Court's order dated November 8, 2000.
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 21; R. at 1136.)
On November 7, 2000, Defendant Larson filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on the remaining claims in the First Amended
Complaint — i . e . , on the Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action (for
alleged breach of the Joint Venture Agreement) and on the
Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action (for alleged default of a
trust deed note).

(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 24; R. at 1048.)

On November 30, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment with respect to alleged liability of the

2

While Defendant Norman did not join in Defendant Arnold's
motion for partial summary judgment, the Court's dismissal of the
Fourth Cause of Action for punitive damages with prejudice
effectively disposed of that issue with respect to both
defendants.
6

Defendants on the trust deed note.
25; R. at 1148.)

(Brief of Appellant, Addendum

On December 13, 2000, Defendant Arnold also

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the first and second
causes of action in the First Amended Complaint.

(Brief of

Appellant, Addendum 30; R. at 13 91.)
In its order dated January 17, 2001, the District Court
granted the motions for summary judgment filed by the Defendants,
and denied the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the
Plaintiffs.

(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 34; R. at 1415.)

This

appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

The Plaintiffs were the owners of 8.33 acres of realty

located adjacent to North Highway 191 in Grand County, Utah.
They operate a water park adjacent to this property.

( Brief of

Appellant, Addendum 2; First Amended Complaint, fH 5, 6; R. at
217. )
2.

In 1995, the Plaintiffs met with Duane Barney, in

Spanish Fork, Utah, to discuss a potential development project
for a Holiday Inn to be located in Moab, Utah.

(Norman Depo.,

13:12 — 14:7; R. at 1096-1097.)
3.

Mr. Barney advised Plaintiff Robert Norman that he had

contacts, among whom he named Greg Page, and said that he had put
together a proposal to construct another Holiday Inn in Spanish

7

Fork, Utah, and that he could assist the Plaintiffs in doing the
same thing in Moab, Utah.
4.

(Norman Depo., 14:16-22; R. at 1097.)

At a second meeting in Moab, Utah, Plaintiff Robert

Norman met with Duane Barney, Greg Page, and Peter Lanto, to
discuss the development proposal.
builder on the project.
1101.)

Mr. Lanto was to be the

(Norman Depo, 16:15 — 18:1; R. at 199-

Neither Duane Barney, Greg Page, nor Peter Lanto are

parties herein.
5.

Greg Page proposed an agreement for the development of

the Holiday Inn, prepared such an agreement, and submitted it to
Plaintiff Robert Norman.

(Norman Depo., 19:4-11; R. at 1102.)

On March 15, 1995, the Plaintiffs and other persons, not
including either of the Defendants herein, executed a document
entitled "Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement" ("the
Joint Venture Agreement"). (R. at 17; R. at 1174.)

Pursuant to

the Joint Venture Agreement, the Plaintiffs contributed their
8.33 acres of realty, referred to above, to the Joint Venture.
(First Amended Complaint, Hl3., R. at 218 J
6.

The original Joint Venture partners were Plaintiff

Robert Norman, Sr.; Plaintiff Diane Norman; Duane Barney; Peter
Lanto; and Eric Rasmussen.
at 1105.)

(R. at 1178; Norman Depo. 27:6-10; R.

In connection with the Plaintiffs1 participation in

the Joint Venture, Greg Page was their principal contact.
(Norman Depo., 61:18-25; R. at 1116.)

Greg Page was the brother-

in-law of Eric Rasmussen, and Plaintiff Robert Norman did not

8

understand why Mr. Rasmussen became a joint venturer instead of
Mr. Page.

(Norman Depo., 18:16 — 19:3; R. at 1101-1102.)

However, the Plaintiffs admit that Mr. Page acted "in the place
of Rasmussen" in the Joint Venture.

(First Amended Complaint, f

11; R. at 217.)
7.

Each of the Joint Venture partners had different roles

with respect to the joint venture.

The Plaintiffs contributed

the real property for the construction of a Holiday Inn Express
in Moab, Utah.

The other members of the Joint Venture were to

contribute "expertise and consideration."
Lanto was to be the builder.
1100-1101.)

(R. at 1179.)

Mr.

(Norman Depo., 17:5 — 18:1; R. at

Mr. Barney was to be the manager of the project.

(Norman Depo., 61:14-15; R. at 1116.)

Mr. Barney and Mr. Page

(who had not signed the joint venture agreement) sought financing
for the project.
8.

(Norman Depo., 18:16 — 19:4; R. at 1101-1102.)

Mr. Page, on behalf of an entity called 4-D

Development, retained Western Empire Advisors, Inc., a company
owned by Defendant Larson, to assist in obtaining financing for
the project, and Larson in turn introduced the Joint Venture
partners to Defendant Arnold, who subsequently became the lawyer
for the joint venture.

(Arnold Aff. % 6, R. at 365; Service

Agreement, R. at 525.)

Western Empire Advisors, Inc. ("WEA") , is

not a party herein.

9

9.

Arnold introduced the Joint Venture partners to Ann

and Norman Young, who provided the short term financing.

(Arnold

Aff., H 7; R. at 365.)
10.

The Youngs agreed to made a short term loan for

$160,000.00, payable in 90 days, at 18 percent interest and with
loan fees totaling 12 points.

(Arnold Aff., R. at 364.)

A

promissory note in favor of the Youngs was executed by the
Plaintiffs and by Duane R. Barney, Gregory A. Page, and Defendant
Norman Me Larson.

The promissory note was signed by the

Defendant Larson at the behest of Defendant Arnold only after it
was entered into by the other parties.

(Larson Depo., 46:22-24;

R. at 1134.)
11.

The Plaintiffs agreed to pledge their property as

collateral for the loan, and signed a deed of trust in the
Youngs' favor.

(Arnold Aff. H 8; Trust Deed, R. at 26). The

loan proceeds were placed into a money market account owned by
WEA, the corporation owned by Defendant Larson.

(Checking

Account Deposit Slip, R. at 533.)
12.

On October 27, 1995, pursuant to a "Purchase

Agreement," Mr. Lanto purported to sell his interest in the joint
venture to Defendant Arnold and WEA, for $8,500.00.

(Purchase

Agreement, R. at 551.)
13.

Defendant Larson obtained uhe Holiday Inn franchise

which he conveyed to the Joint Venture, and thereafter Defendant
Larson sought to obtain the necessary financing for the project,

10

to no avail.

(Larson Depo. 25:1-12, R. at 1131; Arnold Aff. % 9,

R. at 366.)
14.

Defendant Arnold introduced the Plaintiffs to Jim

Winkler, who purchased the property from the Normans and paid off
the Young note.

(B. Norman Depo., 71:14 — 73:4, R. at 457-459;

Assignment of Trust Deed, R. at 565.)

At the closing,

$212,000.00 of the sales proceeds was paid to the Youngs for
release of their trust deed on the property.

(Brief of

Appellant, Addendum 3, Arnold Aff. 1 10, R. at 366.)
15.

The joint venture agreement provides that " [a]dditional

Joint Venturers may be added to the Joint Venture at any time
upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint Venturers."
at 1174.)

(R.

At no time did the Plaintiffs consent to Defendant

Larson becoming a member of the joint venture.
28:23 — 29:3, R. at 1106-1107.)

(Norman Depo,

However, Defendant Norman was

advised by Defendant Arnold, as well as by Mr. Barney and Mr.
Page, that he would receive a 25 percent equity interest in the
project if he was successful in obtaining the needed financing.
(Larson Depo. 59:6-20, R. at 1135.)

The financing was never

forthcoming.
16.

On May 9, 1996, Defendant Larson, as President of WEA,

wrote to the Plaintiffs and proposed, inter

alia,

that his

company, WEA, "pay off the lien of $160,000.00 that presently
exists on the land designated for the motel;" that WEA "provide
the financing for the construction of the motel and refinancing

11

and improvements of [the Plaintiffs'] water park;" and provide
other services related to the construction of the motel if WEA
were permitted to "joint venture the [Plaintiffs'] Waterpark and
the development and construction of a 50 to 80 room motel to be
located adjacent to the water park and on property presently
owned by" the Plaintiffs.
proposal.

The Plaintiffs did not respond to this

(Norman Depo., 89:11 — 90:25, R. at 1119-1120.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT DEFENDANT
LARSON WAS AT NO TIME A MEMBER OF THE MOAB LAND
DEVELOPMENT JOINT VENTURE AND, CONSEQUENTLY, HE COULD
NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, HAVE VIOLATED ANY OF THE TERMS
OF THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT,
Purely as a matter of statutory construction, the Defendant
Larson could not have been a member of the Joint Venture because
in Utah, joint venturers are treated the same as partners, and
Utah law prohibits any person from becoming a partner without the
consent of all other partners.

It is beyond dispute in this case

that the Plaintiffs, who were members of the Joint Venture, at no
time consented to any membership by Defendant Larson in the Joint
Venture.
In addition to purely statutory constraints, the Joint
Venture Agreement itself prohibited the addition of new members
unless all of the then existing members consented.

The

Plaintiffs testified that Larson was never a member of the joint
venture, and that was the Defendant Larson's understanding as
12

well.

Consequently, Defendant Larson could not have violated any

of the terms of the joint venture agreement and the District
Court correctly granted him summary judgment on this issue.

II. THE DEFENDANT LARSON IS NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS WITH RESPECT TO A PROMISSORY
NOTE EXECUTED BY HIM IN FAVOR OF THIRD PARTIES.
The Second Cause of Action alleges that the Defendant Larson
is liable to the Plaintiffs because they sold the property they
had earlier contributed to the joint venture and reduced the
purchase price by "over $200,000" for the amount due on the
promissory note held by the Youngs and executed by, among others,
the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Larson.

However, the Plaintiffs

have failed to allege that they are third party beneficiaries
under the note and, indeed, any such argument fails as a matter
of law.

They have also failed to allege in the First Amended

Complaint any other legal theory of liability against the
Defendant Larson which is cognizable in Utah as a cause of
action.

Instead, they merely allege that the terms of the note

provide for joint and several liability in the event of a
default, and that "defendants Barney, Lanto, Page, Rasmussen,
Larson, and Arnold are each jointly and severally liable to the
Plaintiffs for default."
224.)

(First Amended Complaint, 1 52; R. at

There is no evidence in this case that any such default

occurred and, if it did occur, any such default can only have run
in favor of the Youngs and not the Plaintiffs.
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Under these

circumstances, the District Court correctly granted summary
judgment in favor of the Defendant Larson on this issue.

XXI* THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PUNITIVE
DAMAGES WERE NOT ALLOWABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTRACT
CLAIMS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
This case concerns the Plaintiffs' investment in the Moab
Land Development Joint Venture.

That investment failed.

The

only substantive causes of action in the First Amended Complaint
relating to Defendant Larson — the claim that he breached the
Joint Venture Agreement and that he is liable to the Plaintiffs
based upon his execution of the promissory note — clearly sound
in contract.

Punitive damages are not allowable in Utah for

breach of contract as a matter of law.

IV. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AGAINST
DEFENDANT LARSON IN THIS CASE.
In the exercise of its broad discretion, the District Court
properly declined to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
the facts of this case.

Nor have the Plaintiffs offered any

evidence which would support critical elements of equitable
estoppel.
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V.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO FILE A SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT.
The Plaintiffs' motions to amend their complaint were both
untimely and prejudicial to the Defendants, since discovery had
already been completed by all parties.

Additionally, the

proposed causes of action asserted in the proposed second amended
complaint are futile.

Consequently, the District Court did not

abuse its discretion in denying those motions.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT DEFENDANT
LARSON WAS AT NO TIME A MEMBER OF THE MOAB LAND
DEVELOPMENT JOINT VENTURE AND. CONSEQUENTLY, HE COULD
NOT. AS A MATTER OF LAW, HAVE VIOLATED ANY OF THE TERMS
OF THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT,
The original Complaint herein (Brief of Appellant, Addendum
1; R. at 1) was filed on September 18, 1998, and sets forth, in
its First Cause of Action, that the Defendant Larson was a member
of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture ("the Joint Venture")
and breached that agreement.
9, 1999,

More than a year later, on November

following numerous depositions and other extensive

discovery, the Plaintiffs sought and received permission from the
Court to file a First Amended Complaint (Brief of Appellant,
Addendum 2; R. at 216). But the First Cause of Action set forth
therein is identical to the First Cause of Action in the original
Complaint.

There, the Plaintiffs allege that: (1) the members of

the Joint Venture "at all relevant times" were the Plaintiffs,
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Duane Barney, Eric Rasmussen, Greg Page, Peter Lanto, and
Defendants Mark Arnold and Norman Larson; and (2) that the
Defendants Arnold and Larson breached the Joint Venture Agreement
(a) by failing to secure a Holiday Inn Franchise; (b) by failing
to otherwise develop, manage and maintain the property the
Plaintiffs contributed to the Joint Venture, (c) by failing to
contribute consideration, expertise or anything else to the Joint
Venture; (d) by using the Plaintiffs' property to secure a
$160,000.00 loan, then using the loan proceeds for purposes
unrelated to the Joint Venture and without the knowledge or
consent of the Plaintiffs; and (e) by allowing themselves and
Gregory Page to become members of the Joint Venture contrary to
its provisions.
While the Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants were members
of the Joint Venture "at all relevant times," it is clear that
neither Defendant executed the Joint Venture Agreement (R. at
1174), and thus neither of them were members at the inception of
the venture.

In Utah, joint ventures are subject to the same

rules as partnerships.

759 n.l (Utah 1984); Salt
v. Salt

Lake City

App. 1995) .

See, e.g., Kemp v.

Murray,

Lake Knee & Sports

Knee & Sports

Medicine,

680 P.2d 758,

Rehabilitation,

Inc.

909 P.2d 266 (Utah Ct.

Thus, because " [n]o person can become a member of a

partnership without the consent of all the partners," UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-1-15(7), it is equally impossible for any person to
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become a member of a joint venture without the consent of all the
joint venturers.

There is simply no evidence in this case from

which it could be concluded that any of the joint venturers
consented to Defendant Larson's membership in the Joint Venture.
Thus, Plaintiff Robert Norman testified in his deposition that he
never gave his consent for any other individual to become a
member of the Joint Venture.
1106-1107.)

(Norman Depo., 28:23 — 29:3; R. at

This testimony is fully consistent with the

deposition testimony of the Defendant Larson that he was not a
member of the Joint Venture.

(Larson Depo., 42:2-4. R. at 1133.)

Except for the parties, none of the other members of the Joint
Venture was deposed, nor was any other form of admissible
evidence elicited from them, and thus the Plaintiffs are unable
to demonstrate the extent to which, if at all, those other joint
venturers consented to Defendant Larson joining the joint
venture.
The Joint Venture agreement itself, following the
requirements of Utah law, provided that " [a]dditional joint
venturers may be added to the Joint Venture at any time upon
agreement of all of the then existing Joint Venturers."
1174.)

(R. at

Without unanimous agreement of the existing joint

venturers, therefore, it is clear that Defendant Norman could not
have become a member.

Significantly, Larson did, at one time,

propose to the Plaintiffs that his company, Western Empire
Advisors, Inc., become a member of a joint venture with them
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related to the project, but the Plaintiffs never accepted that
proposal.

(Norman Depo. 89:14 — 90:16, R. at 1120-1121.)

The leading case in Utah defining the elements essential to
a joint venture is Bassett

v.

Baker,

530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974).

There, the Court held that, to establish the existence of a joint
venture
there must be a community of interest in the performance of
the common purpose, a joint proprietary interest in the
subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share
in the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the
contrary, a duty to share in any losses which may be
sustained.
Id.

Notably, as to both Defendants, none of these elements are

even alleged in the in the First Amended Complaint.

Nor could

they be properly alleged with respect to Defendant Larson.

He

clearly had no "joint proprietary interest in the subject
matter," no "mutual right to control," no "right to share in the
profits," and no "duty to share in any losses which may be
sustained."

As a matter of law, therefore, he was not a member

of the Joint Venture and assumes no liability for any alleged
breach of the joint venture agreement.
Defendant Larson understood that he had the potential

to

become a member of the Joint Venture if he was successful in
securing the necessary financing.

He was advised by Defendant

Arnold, as well as by Mr. Barney and Mr. Page, that he would
receive a 25 percent equity interest in the project if he was
successful in obtaining that financing.
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(Larson Depo. 59:13-20,

R. at 1135.)

But the financing was never forthcoming, and thus

his potential membership in the joint venture never materialized.
The Plaintiffs, seeking recovery for an alleged breach of
the joint venture agreement, seek recovery against Larson, who
was not a member of the joint venture, but not against any of the
persons who were among the original members of the joint venture.
This is simply inexplicable.

To whatever extent the Plaintiffs

believe they may have a cause of action for breach of the joint
venture agreement, any such cause of action necessarily runs
against those who were actually members of the Joint Venture.
Defendant Larson was simply not a such a member, nor is there
even a scintilla of evidence in the record from which it can
properly be concluded that the Plaintiffs were "approached by"
Larson in 1995 with a proposal to develop the Holiday Inn
property.

(First Amended Complaint, % 7; R. at 217.)

Finally, the Plaintiffs' theory that there was a breach of
the joint venture agreement is fraught with other difficulties
the Plaintiffs have simply chosen to ignore.

It is clear that

any such breach would create obligations belonging to the joint
venture, which in law is treated as a partnership, Salt

& Sports
Medicine,

Rehabilitation,

Inc.

Lake

Knee

v\ Salt Lake City Knee & Sports

909 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and any such

obligations do not belong to the Plaintiffs individually, but to
the Joint Venture, which has not been named as a party.

It is

hornbook law that partnership debts and obligations must be
19

satisfied by partnership assets to the extent any exist before
any creditor can seek satisfaction from individual assets.
McCune & McCune v.
1988).

Mountain

Bell

Telephone,

758 P.2d 914 (Utah

While the Plaintiffs have failed to set forth any

accounting of the partnership assets, it is very clear that at
least one of those assets was the property they themselves
contributed.

In some unexplained fashion, that property was

ultimately sold by the plaintiffs to a third party, evidently
without obtaining any approval from the other members of the
joint venture, let alone from Defendant Larson.

Traditional

concepts of partnership law would suggest that, in the event of a
breach of the joint venture agreement, the Plaintiffs would be in
a position to seek contribution from the other individual members
of the joint venture to the extent partnership assets do not make
them whole.

Because Defendant Larson was not such a member,

however, they would not, as a matter of law, be able to seek any
such contribution from him.
Traditional concepts of contract law also support this
result, since mutual assent is the cornerstone upon which
contracts are formed.
Calrae

Trust,

See,

e.g.,

Aquagen

International,

972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998); Vasels

Inc.
v.

v.

LoGuidice,

740 P.2d 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) . Here, none of the parties
has acknowledged any such mutual assent, and thus it is simply
beyond dispute that Defendant Norman was not a member of the
joint venture and owed no duty as such to the Plaintiffs.
20

See

Soule

v. Weatherby,

118 P. 833, 834 (Utah 1911) ("[i]n the

obligation assumed by the defendant is found his duty, and his
failure to comply with the duty constitutes the breach.")

II. THE DEFENDANT LARSON IS NOT. AS A MATTER OF LAW,
LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS WITH RESPECT TO A PROMISSORY
NOTE EXECUTED BY HIM IN FAVOR OF THIRD PARTIES.
In their Second Cause of Action, — which the Plaintiffs
frame as "Default of Trust Deed Note" — the Plaintiffs assert
that they somehow sold their property which had previously been
contributed to the Joint Venture, that the buyer was the
successor-in-interest on the promissory note executed by
Defendant Larson and the members of the Joint Venture, and that
the purchase price of the property was "reduced by over $200,000
that was then owing on the Note."

They seek damages of "not less

than" that amount.
First, the promissory note is drawn, not in favor of the
Plaintiffs, but in favor of Ann Young and Norman Young.
26-27.)

(R. at

The Plaintiffs have not asserted that they were

beneficiaries under that note or otherwise had any interest in it
as obligees; rather, they were merely obligors with the Defendant
Larson and others in the event of default.

Thus, they have

identified no cognizable legal theory pursuant to which Defendant
Larson is liable to them for their alleged loss on the sale of
the property.

It is clear that they have failed to allege that

they are beneficiaries under the note because any such allegation
21

fails both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.

In Utah,

promissory notes are treated as contracts between the parties,
see, e.g., Stacey

Properties

v. Wixen,

766 P.2d 1080 (Utah Ct.

App. 1988), and to have enforceable rights under a contract, the
Plaintiffs must show that they were intended
contract.

Miller

Ct. App. 1999).

v.

Martineau

& Co.,

beneficiaries of the

983 P.2d 1107, 1114 (Utah

No such showing has been made in this case, as

indeed it could not be, since no language expressing any such
intention is contained in the note itself and no other evidence
has been offered by the Plaintiffs in support of any such
intention.
Second, the Plaintiffs offered nothing to show that there
was any default and foreclosure with respect to the note at any
time.

Rather, apparently in anticipation of such a foreclosure,

the Plaintiffs apparently withdrew the realty pledged for the
loan from the Joint Venture assets, then sold that asset to a
third party, Jim Winkler.

The amount of the Young loan was paid

off at that time, and the Plaintiffs now assert that they had a
loss on the non-existent "default" and are entitled to collect
damages from the Defendant Larson.
assuming, arguendo,

It is very clear that

there had been a default of the promissory

note, the Defendant Larson could have been liable, with the
members of the Joint Venture, to the Youngs.

But there is

nothing in the voluminous record in this case to support any
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theory that the loan was ever in default, that the Youngs ever
sought to foreclose their trust deed, or that the Defendant
Larson incurred any liability to

the

Plaintiffs

for any alleged

default.
Rather, it is the members of the Joint Venture who incur a
duty to indemnify the Plaintiffs for any payments they reasonably
made to conduct the business of the joint venture or preserve its
property pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-15(2).

That statute

provides that
[t]he partnership must indemnify every partner in
respect of payments made and personal liabilities
reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary and proper
conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its
business or property.
Whether indemnification would be required of the other joint
venturers under the facts of this case is problematical, as the
question whether the loss on the sale of the property occurred in
the conducting of joint venture business or for the preservation
of its business or property is disputable.

But there can be no

dispute that Defendant Larson was not a member of the joint
venture, and as a non-member, he clearly has no statutory duty of
indemnification to the Plaintiffs in the amount of the trust deed
note.

.
Most significantly, the Plaintiffs have failed to identify

any duty — sounding in contract, in tort, or on any other basis
—

owed by Defendant Larson to the Plaintiffs sufficient to hold

him liable for their alleged losses on the sale of their
23

property.

Defendant was never a member of the joint venture;

Defendant did not have any separate contractual arrangement with
the Plaintiffs; and the Defendant did not participate in the
negotiations leading up to the sale of the property or the sale
itself.

Under these circumstances, the Plaintiffs' cause of

action is fatally flawed: baldly stated, neither in their
original Complaint nor in their First Amended Complaint have they
come forward with any cognizable legal theory setting forth a
recognized cause of action against the Defendant Larson for their
alleged losses.
The Plaintiffs' claim as set forth in their First Amended
Complaint is that the Defendant Larson is "jointly and severally
liable to the Plaintiffs for default of the Note."
52; R. at 224, Brief of Appellant, Addendum 2.)

(Complaint, %
On appeal,

however, they abandon that argument to insist that Defendant
Larson is liable for "a proportionate share of the liability
under the trust deed note."

(Brief of Appellant at 30.)

With no

citation to authority, they then suggest that the Plaintiffs are
"entitled to contribution from the co-obligors as a matter of law
and equity."

Not only was this suggestion not raised in the

First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs offer no argument at all
in support of their new position.
not consider this new issue.

Accordingly, the Court should

See MacKay v. Hardy,

947-948 (Utah 1998) .
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973 P.2d 941,

III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PUNITIVE
DAMAGES WERE NOT ALLOWABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTRACT
CLAIMS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE,
Both of the substantive causes of action herein — one for
an alleged breach of a joint venture agreement and one for an
alleged default of a trust deed note — clearly sound in
contract.

It is now well settled in this jurisdiction that

"punitive damages cannot be awarded for a breach of contract
unless the breach amounts to an independent tort."

Highland

Construction

Co. v. Union Pacific

1049 (Utah 1984); Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau
(Utah Ct. App. 2001).

R.R.,
Ins.

See, e.g.,

683 P.2d 1042,
Co.,

19 P.3d 392

While the Plaintiffs have not alleged any

such "independent tort/ they suggest that the factual
allegations in their First Amended Complaint amount to claims for
fraud, intentional misrepresentation, and intentional
interference with existing and potential economic relations.
at 766.)

(R.

A review of the Fourth Cause of Action in the First

Amended Complaint (R. at 228), however, makes abundantly clear
that none of these claims has even remotely been alleged.
Instead, the Plaintiffs allege only that the actions taken by the
Defendants were "knowing" and "intentional."

At best, these

allegations may suggest that the contract violations allegedly
committed by the Defendants were willful and malicious.

In Utah,

however, even willful and malicious breaches of contract terms do
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not, as a matter of law, support a claim for punitive damages.
Jorgensen

v. John

Clay

and Co.,

660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983) .

In paragraph 89 of the First Amended Complaint (R. at 229),
it is alleged "that the Defendants knowingly and intentionally
lied to them and misrepresented themselves, their conduct and
their intentions . . .".

This language plainly does not rise to

the level of stating a cause of action for the tort of
intentional or even negligent misrepresentation.
This Court has described the tort of negligent
misrepresentation as follows:
[T]he tort of negligent misrepresentation . . .
provides that a party injured by reasonable reliance
upon a party's careless or negligent misrepresentation
of a material fact may recover damages resulting from
that injury when the second party had a pecuniary
interest in the transaction, was in a superior position
to know the material facts, and should have reasonably
foreseen that the injured party was likely to rely upon
the fact.
Price-Orem

Inv.

(Utah 1988).

Co.

v.

Rollins,

Brown

& Gunnel1,

713 P.2d 55, 59

Here, not only have the Plaintiffs failed to set

forth any of the alleged misrepresentations in their First
Amended Complaint, they have also failed to allege their own
reasonable reliance, failed to allege the Defendant Larson's
superior position to know the material facts, and failed to
allege the reasonable forseeability of the alleged injury.
This Court has also described the elements of fraudulent
misrepresentation as follows:
(1) a misrepresentation; (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which
26

the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b)
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5)
for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon
it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it;
(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury
and damage.
Dugan v.

Jones,

615 P.2d 123 9, 1246 (Utah 1980) . Other than the

bare allegation that some otherwise unidentified
misrepresentation occurred, the Plaintiffs have failed to make
factual allegations concerning any of these critical elements.
Reading the allegations of the First Amended Complaint most
favorably to the Plaintiffs, they have simply failed to raise any
cognizable tort claims upon which a cause of action for punitive
damages could be predicated.
Notably, it is the alleged contract breach itself which must
constitute an "independent tort" to support a claim for punitive

damages.

Highland

Construction

P.2d 1042, 1049 (Utah 1984) see
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Co. v. Union Pacific
also

Brown

v.

Weis,

R.R., 683
871 P.2d 552,

None of the facts alleged in the First

Cause of Action in support of the claimed breach of the Joint
Venture Agreement contain any suggestion that a negligent or
fraudulent misrepresentation by the Defendants caused the alleged
breach.

Instead, the Plaintiffs allege that the breach occurred

because the Defendants (1) failed to secure the Holiday Inn
franchise; (2) failed to develop, manage and maintain the
property contributed by the Plaintiffs to the Joint Venture; (3)
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failed to contribute consideration, expertise, or anything else
of value to the Joint Venture; (4) used the Plaintiffs' property
to secure a loan which was expended for purposes unrelated to the
Joint Venture; and (5) allowed themselves and Mr. Page to become
members of the Joint Venture "contrary to its provisions."
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 2, First Amended Complaint, 11 4144, R. at 222-223.)

Whether considered independently or

together, none of these allegations constitute the "independent
tort" necessary for the imposition of punitive damages.
A similar analysis is appropriate with respect to the Second
Cause of Action, for alleged Default of the Trust Deed Note.
None of the allegations relating to the alleged default can
reasonably be read as establishing some "independent tort" upon
which a claim of punitive damages could be based.
For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the
District Court properly dismissed the Fourth Cause of Action, for
punitive damages, with prejudice.

IV. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AGAINST
DEFENDANT LARSON IN THIS CASE.
The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants should be equitably
estopped to deny their membership in the Joint Venture and
liability under the trust deed note because
as members of the joint venture, or as professionals
working on behalf of the joint venture, [they]
intentionally violated the provisions of the joint
venture agreement and ultimately, directly caused its
dissolution. They nevertheless publicly continued to
28

act as members and representatives of a joint venture
including the plaintiffs thereafter. The plaintiffs
were aware of and acquiesced to the defendants'
activities on behalf of the venture, and now are in the
position of having to fully absorb a loss in excess of
$200,000 and control of their adjoining property if the
defendants are allowed to escape liability for their
conduct.3
(Brief of Appellants at 29.)

The Plaintiffs make no citation to

the record in support of any of these assertions.
Two preliminary difficulties with the Plaintiffs1 argument
must be pointed out at once.

First, it should be noted that the

Plaintiffs' argument plainly addresses only the First Cause of
Action in the First Amended Complaint (the alleged breach of the
Joint Venture kgreement^ and not the Second Cause of Action ^the
alleged default on the trust deed note).

Consequently, although

they have purported to raise the equitable estoppel argument with
respect to the alleged default on the trust deed note (Brief of
Appellant at 4 ) , they are not entitled to be heard on that issue
because they have not offered any argument.
Mobile

Home Park,

Ltd.

v. Peebles,

See,

e.g.,

Brookside

14 P.3d 105, 114 (Utah Ct.

App. 2000) ("Brookside has not complied with our briefing rules
requiring a proper legal argument "with citations to the
authorities . . . relied on. ' We therefore decline to address
this argument." [Citations omitted.])

3

The quoted language constitutes virtually the entire
argument of the Plaintiffs with respect to the equitable
estoppel issue.
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Second, the Plaintiffs argue that the original joint venture
was dissolved through the fault of the Defendants and that the
Defendants then became members of some other
membership is unstated.

joint venture whose

None of these assertions are anywhere

included in the First Amended Complaint and they are not
appropriately before the Court unless the Plaintiffs prevail on
their argument that the District Court abused its discretion in
denying the Plaintiffs' motion to further amend their complaint.
Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2)
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken
or not taken on the basis of the first party's
statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3)
injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate
such statement, admission, act, or failure to act.

Nunley
1999).

v.

Westates

Casing

Services,

Inc.,

989 P.2d 1077 (Utah

While the Plaintiffs have clearly alleged they were

injured by the alleged breach of the Joint Venture Agreement,
they have offered no evidence to suggest that Defendant Larson
made any inconsistent statement or that they took any reasonable
action or inaction based upon any specific statement by Defendant
Larson.

While the Plaintiffs suggest that Defendant Larson

"represented himself as a partner," they make no citation to the
record in support of this claim.

Even had he made such a

representation, however, it is obviously required that the
representation must have been communicated to the Plaintiffs in
some fashion before they could rely on it to their detriment.
30

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-13 (1) . There is simply nothing in the
record which would even remotely support a finding that any such
communication occurred.
It is true that Defendant Arnold, on behalf of himself and
Western

Empire

Advisors,

Inc.,

purported to purchase the interest

of Peter Lanto in the Holiday Inn Venture.
agreement is dated October 27, 1995.

The purchase

(R. at 551.)

There is,

however, nothing in the record to suggest that the purported
purchase by Western Empire Advisors was ever communicated to the
Plaintiffs.

Even more damaging to the Plaintiffs' position,

Western Empire Advisors is not a party herein and cannot be
deemed the alter ego of Defendant Larson without a showing (1)
that there is such a unity of interest and ownership between the
corporation and the individual that the separate personalities of
the company and the individual no longer exist and should be
disregarded; and (2) that the observance of the corporate form
would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.
v. Murray
1979).

First

Thrift

& Loan

Co.,

See, e.g., Norman

596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah

The Plaintiffs have offered no evidence whatsoever in

support of any such claim, nor did they even bother to plead the
alter ego theory in their First Amended Complaint.
Shortly after the purported purchase of Lanto!s interest, on
November 3, 1995, Defendant Larson wrote a letter to Bruce Holman
of Trust Guarantee Corporation on the letterhead of Western
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Empire Advisors stating that " [w]e are very anxious to proceed
since we own an equity position in both projects and I have the
Holiday Express Franchise."

(R. at 555.)

Again, however, it is

clear that the parties being referred to are the Defendant Arnold
and Western Empire Advisors, not the Defendant Larson in any
individual capacity.
The District Court has broad discretion whether to apply the
doctrine of equitable estoppel to a given case.
ex rel.

Parker

v. Irizarry,

Trolley

Square

Associates

App. 1994) .

See,

e.g.,

State

945 P.2d 676, 682 (Utah 1997);

v. Nielson,

886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct.

Here, the Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence

to the trial court in support of their estoppel argument as to
Defendant Larson.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be said

that the Court abused its broad discretion.

V.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO FILE A SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT.
The Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint in this case
on September 18, 1998.
1.)

(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 1; R. at

Following extensive discovery, including depositions of all

parties, the Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on
November 9, 1999. (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 2; R. at 216.)
The case was set for trial on August 28, 2000, but the Court
declared a mistrial on that date.
12, 38; R. at 962; R at 1432.)
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(Brief of Appellant, Addendums

Shortly following the mistrial, on September 1, 2000, the
Plaintiffs filed their Motion to File 2 nd Amended Complaint.
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 13; R. at 971.)

In that motion,

the Plaintiffs proposed to amend their First Amended Complaint
for the following purposes:
(1)

to add the Moab Land Development Joint Venture as a

party plaintiff;
(2)

to assert claims of "professional negligence and

liability as agent" against Defendant Arnold, and against
Defendant Larson and Western Empire Advisors, Inc., as "financial
expert;"
(3)

to add Mr. Rasmussen and Mr. Lanto as defendants; and

(4)

to assert claims against Mr. Lanto and Mr. Rasmussen

arising under the Joint Venture Agreement.
(R. at 973.)
The Defendant Larson filed his objection to the Plaintiffs'
motion on or about September 19, 2000

(Brief of Appellant,

Addendum 15, R. at 1013); and the Defendant Arnold filed his
opposition to the motion on or about September 16, 2000 (Brief of
Appellee Larson, Addendum C; R. at 9 8 3 ) .

Inexplicably, prior to

any ruling of the District Court on their motion, the Plaintiffs
filed a Motion to Further Amend Complaint on September 25, 2000.
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 16, R. at 1019.)

The stated

purpose of the proposed further amendment to the Complaint was
"to allow the Plaintiffs to plead alternative theories of
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liability: (1) under the joint venture agreement; and (2)
individual liability."

(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 16, R. at

1021.)
The District Court denied both the Motion to File 2nd
Amended Complaint and the Motion to Further Amend the Complaint
in its Order dated November 8, 2000.

(Brief of Appellant,

Addendum 21; R. at 113 6.)
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend a
pleading "shall be freely given when justice so requires," but,
as this Court has noted, "the liberality of the rule is not
without limit . . .".
1960).

Dupler

v.

Yates,

351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah

More recently, the Court has suggested" that "[t]his

liberal application of rule 15(a), however, is limited when the
opposing party does not have adequate opportunity to respond to
the amended pleadings."
(Utah 1993).

Tiwm v.

Dewsnup,

851 P.2d 1178, 1183

Here, the Plaintiffs sought their second amendment,

and their "further amendment," long after the opposing parties
had completed their discovery, designated their witnesses,
identified their exhibits, and otherwise fully prepared the case
for trial.

Indeed, the proposed amendments came after the trial

was commenced and aborted on August 28, 2000.
Resolution of motions to amend are left to the sound
discretion of the trial court.

Id.

at 1182.

A primary

consideration in determining whether an amendment should be
allowed is whether the opposing party is "put to unavoidable
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prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which he has not had
time to prepare.
(Utah 1983).

Bekins

Bar V Ranch

v. Huth,

664 P.2d 455, 464

Finally, a motion to amend should not be granted

where the pleader does not set forth a legally sufficient claim,
Timm v. Dewsnup,

921 P.2d 1381, 1389 (Utah 1996), as any such

amendment would be futile.
The proposed amendments would add new claims and new parties
which would significantly alter the issues in this case.
However, the precise language of the Plaintiffs1 proposed
amendments are not part of the record in this case, because the
Plaintiffs elected not to file their proposed Second Amended
Complaint and their proposed Further Amendment with the District
Court.4

It is thus impossible to determine from the language of

the proposed amendments themselves whether they are legally
insufficient or futile.

4

Curiously, the Plaintiffs did serve a copy of the proposed
Second Amended Complaint on the Defendant Larson on or about
September 1, 2000. Only upon reviewing the record in this case
in preparation for writing this brief did Defendant Larson's
Counsel discover that the proposed second amendment was not filed
with the Court and was thus not made part of the record. The
same is true with respect to the Plaintiffs' proposed "Further
Amendment," a copy of which was served on counsel for Defendant
Larson on or about September 25, 2000. For whatever reasons, the
Plaintiffs have elected not to make these documents part of the
record. "Evidence not available to the trial judge cannot be
added to the record on appeal." Territorial
Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v.
Baird,
781 P.2d 452, 455-456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Condor v.
A.L.
Williams
& Assocs.,
Inc.,
739 P.2d 634, 635-636 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
This follows from the language of Rule 11(h) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which allows correction or
modification of the record to reflect what the record "truly
discloses . . . occurred in the Trial Court."
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As this Court has recently noted, "[t]he well-established
abuse of discretion standard of review requires us to "presume
that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised
unless the record clearly shows the contrary, '" In re Marriage
Gonzalez,
Hickman,

1 P.3d 1074, 1085 (Utah 2000), citing
685 P.2d 530, 534-535 (Utah 1984).

Goddard

of

v.

It is the burden of

the appellants to provide the reviewing court with an adequate
record on appeal to prove their allegations, Call
Jordan,

v. City

of

788 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,

West

800

P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) . When crucial matters are not included in
the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the
actions of the trial court.

Bowers-Irons

Recreation

InterjnoiLntain Power Agency

Land & Cattle

(Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Theison,
1985).

Co.,

v.

786 P.2d 250, 252

709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah

In light of the Plaintiffs' failure to submit an adequate

record, they cannot prevail on this issue and the District
Court's exercise of its broad discretion must be sustained.
At the hearing on the Plaintiffs' Motions to Amend on
October 10, 2000 (R. 1430), the Plaintiffs argued only that they
should be able to amend the First Amended Complaint to add new
parties, Western Empire Advisors and Pete Lanto.

The Plaintiffs

argued that, because the Defendants had suggested these parties
were indispensable to any resolution of the Plaintiffs' claims,
they should be permitted to add these new parties after the close
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of discovery and after the mistrial.

(Brief of Appellant,

Addendum 36, 10/10/2000 Hearing, Tr. 6:18 — 7:17, R. at 1430.)
Significantly, the Plaintiffs offer no explanation whatsoever for
why the proposed amendments were not sought in a timely fashion.
This Court has denied a motion to amend under similar
circumstances, where a party had already gone to the expense of
discovery and preparing for trial, had relied on the opposing
party's pleadings filed long before the trial, and had responded
to discovery with specificity, setting forth all relevant facts,

events, and dates.

Staker

v. Huntington

P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983).

Cleveland

Irr.

Co.,

664

The denial of a motion to amend is

particularly appropriate where, as here, the party seeking to
amend alleges no surprise, discovery of new evidence, or any
other justification for the delay in seeking the amendment.

see also

Mountain

America

Credit

Union v. McClellan,

Id;

854 P.2d

590, 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The District Court concluded that the Plaintiffs' motions to
amend should be denied because the proposed amendments came
very late in the process. If I have any discretion to
grant, I think I should do so only under circumstances
where the equities overwhelmingly favor granting the
amendment. And in this case, it seems to me that these
facts were known earlier than right at trial, that what
is — what is really placing the plaintiff [sic] in the
bind is a failure to predict what the ruling would be
on legal issues that the Court has made, and I think
those might have been predicted better.
Also, the — there certainly would be expense to
the defendants in preparing for trial with the expanded
claims, and they could prepare, but it would be
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expensive to do so. And I also think, as Mr. Lalli has
argued, that there is real doubt about the viability of
these claims and, although they may not be subject to
attack on a motion for summary judgment, the likelihood
of their succeeding is significantly less than 50
percent, particularly the — in effect, a derivative
partner claim on behalf of the limited partnership is
— or on behalf of the joint venture is something that
I'm aware of no authority to support. It's an analogy
to the derivative actions by shareholders. This may be
the case where the Supreme Court would say, yes, it
should — there should be such a derivative action, but
there' s some — they are some legal theories that have
not yet been approved, as far as I know, by any
Appellate Courts in Utah.
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 36, 10/10/2000 Hearing, Tr. 48:19
— 4 9 : 1 9 , R. at 1430.)

It is clear from the District Court's

ruling that the Court exercised its discretion to deny any
further amended complaint because those amendments were (a)
untimely; and (b) prejudicial to the Defendants.

Because the

District Court's ruling is fully in accord with the law of this
jurisdiction, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the Plaintiffs' motion.
The "derivative partner claim" referenced by the District
Court relates to the Plaintiffs' efforts to add the Moab Land
Development Joint Venture as a party in their Motion to File 2rici
Amended Complaint.

(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 13, R. at 973.)

That claim is one of many which was not addressed by the
Plaintiffs at oral argument and, as noted above, the Plaintiffs
have also declined to make their proposed Second Amended
Complaint or their Further Amendment part of the record in this
case.

This makes any proper analysis of their proposed

38

amendments virtually impossible.

In any event, while this Court

has permitted corporate principles concerning derivative actions
to be applied to limited
Bank,

partnerships, Arndt

v.

First

Interstate

991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999), Defendant Larson has discovered

no case where such a cause of action has been applied to general
partnerships or to joint ventures such as the one involved in
this case.

There is simply no authority for the Plaintiffs to

attempt to bring any suit on behalf of the joint venture without
joining each of the joint venturers as plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs also propose to assert a new cause of action
against both Defendant Arnold and Defendant Larson for
"professional negligence and liability as agent against Mark
Arnold (as counsel) and Norman Larson and/or Western Empire
Advisors (as financial expert)."
13, R. at 973.)

(Brief of Appellant, Addendum

While the precise nature of this new cause of

action is unclear, it appears that the Plaintiffs would seek to
allege that "Larson and/or Western Empire Advisors" entered into
a contractual arrangement to secure funding for the Joint
Venture; that Defendant Larson (or proposed Defendant Western
Empire Advisors) had some fiduciary duty to the Joint Venture as
a financial consultant; and that Defendant Larson (or proposed
Defendant Western Empire Advisors) is on that basis liable to the
plaintiffs for their alleged losses.

The primary difficulty with

any such cause of action is that contractual obligations do not
ordinarily give rise to fiduciary obligations because "the rights
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and duties of parties to a contract may generally be freely
transferred, parties may act for their own interests during the
execution of a contract, and they have no duty of loyal
representation of the opposing party . . .".
982 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 1999).

Semenov

v.

Hill,

But there is an even greater

difficulty with the Plaintiffs' proposed cause of action.

The

Plaintiffs appear to assert that WEA was the "agent" of the Joint
Venture, and the law is clear that "[t]o be an agent, a person
must be authorized by another to "act on his behalf and subject
to his control.'" Gildea
1269 (Utah 1998) .

v. Guardian

Title

Co.,

970 P.2d 1265,

The Plaintiffs have come forward with no
Joint

evidence from which it could properly be concluded that the
Venture

at any time provided any such authorization to the

Defendant Larson or WEA.

To be sure, there is a "Service

Agreement" pursuant to which WEA agrees to "arrange financing" for
the benefit of an entity called 4-D Development, (R. at 525) but
there is nothing in the record to suggest that 4-D Development is
in any way associated with the Moab Land Development Joint
Venture or authorized to bind third parties on its behalf.

Under

these circumstances, it is clear that no agency relationship
exists between the Joint Venture and WEA.

Further, even if WEA

undertook some duty as agent of the Joint Venture, it is
incumbent upon the Plaintiffs to demonstrate the extent of that
duty and the fashion in which it was violated.
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Id.

at 1270.

This the Plaintiffs have failed to do.

Thus, the proposed

"professional liability" cause of action in the Second Amended
Complaint fails as a matter of law.
Finally, the Plaintiffs also propose to amend their
complaint to add Western Empire Advisors, Inc., as a party
defendant in this case.

Again, however, the Plaintiffs have

failed to set forth why they have failed to seek the addition of
WEA in a timely fashion.

Virtually all of the relevant documents

the Plaintiff sought and received in this case in discovery from
the Defendant Larson make very clear that he acted for and on
behalf of Western Empire Advisors.

(R. at 524, 525-528, 529,

530, 531, 534, 535, 539, 540, 541, 542, 545, 547, 548, 551,
555,556, 557,558, 559, 563). Having provided no explanation for
their lack of timeliness, the Plaintiffs cannot show that the
District Court abused its discretion in denying their motion to

amend.

See,

e.g.,

Mountain

America

Credit

854 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Hill
Insurance

Co.,

v.

Union v.
State

McClellan,

Farm Mutual

Auto

829 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

CONCLUSION
Because there is no genuine issue of material fact with
respect to any of the appealed issues herein, the District Court
was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants and denying the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment.

Further, the District Court did not abuse its
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discretion in declining to apply principles of equitable estoppel
in this case, nor did it abuse its discretion in declining to
allow the Plaintiffs to file a Second Amended Complaint.

It is

respectfully submitted that the District Court's rulings herein
should

be affirmed
DATED this

by this

18*1

Court.
day of June, 2001

VW*(J. fjz^k^
James C. Haskins /^ c^c^
Attorney for Defendant
Norman M. Larson

l(fofci-fci_
Thomas N. \Thompson
A t t o r n e y fosi d e f e n d a n t
Norman M. Larson
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A.

No, sir, I was not successful in arranging

financing for the project.

However, I did receive

commitments to fund the project but it was never funded.
Q.

Who did you receive the commitments from?

A.

National Acceptance Corporation.

Q.

Anyone else?

A.

Not as a commitment, no.

Q.

How much commitment did you receive from National

Acceptance?
Ac

They said that they would fund $8 million on this

project and the Holiday Express in Park City, Jeremy Ranch,
that 4-D Development was also working on.
Q.

What was 4-D Development?

A.

That was the original entity that was to joint

venture with Mr. Norman in building a Holiday Express in
Moab, Utah.
Q.

What kind of entity was it?

A.

I think it was a corporation.

Q.

Do you know who was involved in it?

A.

You have documentation to that effect.

recall.

I don't know.

I don't

I know three people that were involved, Greg Page,

Duane Barney and Pete Lanto*
Q.

Do you think there were others?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

Did the Park City project go forward?
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there just three plaintiffs?
A.

There would have been three plaintiffs.

Q.

Who were the others?

A.

Fellow named Allen Williams, he's from Bountiful.

And the third one was from Phoenix and I don't recall his
name.

I do believe that Mr. Williams did file suit.
Q.

Do you know what the result of it was?

A.

I don't.

Q.

So back to this commitment business, I'm not

asking you a legal question, although it's going to sound
like one.

If a funding entity gives you a commitment to

provide funds and then doesn't do it, do you believe that you
have a valid claim against that funding entity?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Is there anything that you are aware of that

would have made the claim in this instance not valid or less
valid?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

You mentioned that you were involved in other

projects in the Moab area.
A.

Well —

off the record, okay?

MR. RUSSELL:
to your attorney?

What are they?
Can we do that?

All right. You just want to talk

Sure, go ahead.

(Off the record.)
THE WITNESS:

Back on the record.

Thank you.
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We are presently working on a 109 unit
condominium project for a fellow named Richard Zinn, Z-i-n-n,
Zinn & Associates in Moab on the golf course. We anticipate
financing today«
Q.

That's actually out in Spanish Valley, isn't it?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Any others?

A.

Yes. We were working with Mr. Jack Dunlop on

putting a hotel convenience store together on his property,
just north of Mr. Norman's, right on the corner there.
Q.

Corner of what?

A.

The highway going to Grand Junction and the

highway going to Moab.

Okay?

The southeast corner.

Q.

You said we.

A.

Myself and several other people that were wanting

to do a development there.

One of them was Mr. Zinn, Dick

Zinn.
Q.

Any of the other parties involved in this

litigation?
A.

No.

Q.

Is that project still ongoing?

A.

I stopped the project when I got the claim, or

the Complaint, because we were trying to tie in
Mr. Norman's property and see if we could partially recoup
some of the money that was lost through his land.

There
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1
2

part of the joint venture?
A.

I was never a part of the joint venture because

3

was unable to provide financing.

4

franchise in my name.

5

Q.

Provided it to who?

6

A.

The joint venture.

But I did provide the

It was assumed that the

7

franchise, once the funding was in place, would be the

8

franchise for the project.

9
10

Q.

Did you ever transfer the franchise to the joint

venture or to any other party other than yourself?

11

A.

Yes, I did.

12

Q.

When did you do that?

13

A.

It was in 1996 when I was requested to do so, so

14

that they could keep the franchise, they being Mr.* Page,

15

Mr. Arnold, and Mr. Barney.

16

Q.

Where was- Bob Norman in all this?

17

A.

Mr. Barney and Mr. Page communicated with

18

Mr. Norman directly.

I wasn't privy to do that. I had met

19

with Mr. Norman, with Mr. Page, Mr. Arnold, with Mr. Barney

20

on one occasion. And we looked at the project, we went up to

21

his home and spent about an hour, hour-and-a-half, and left.

22

That was the only time that Mr. Arnold, Mr. Barney, Mr. Page,

23

and myself collectively have met with Mr. Norman.

24

Q.

Were you requested to obtain this franchise?

25

A.

Yes.
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for that franchise?
A.

Reimbursed, yes.
(Deposition Exhibit 4 marked for identification.)

Q.

This is Exhibit 4.

That's a note secured by deed

of trust, deed of trust is Exhibit 3.

The note is also dated

and signed June 27, 1995.
A.

Yes, sir.

Q,

Have you seen that before?

A.

It was a —

the Complaint.

I had seen it.

It was an addendum to

That's the first time I recall seeing it

specifically.
Q.

Did you see your signature on the document that

was the addendum to. the Complaint?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Is that your signature?

A.-

It is.

Q.

So you must have seen it before that?

A.

I must have but I don't recall.

Q.

You are not denying that it was your signature?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you know when you signed it?

A.

I don't specifically know when I signed it. I

recall that the Youngs wanted me to sign the note also after
the fact, which I did, at the request of Mr. Arnold.
were his clients.

They

So it was an added security for those
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the joint venture, they wouldn't have honored it.
Q.

Holiday Inn wouldn't have?

A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

A.

What's the question again?

Q.

Having been reimbursed for the franchise fee,

How about my question?

whether or not it was still in your name, wouldn't it be fair
to say that you had no longer any investment in the joint
venture?
A.

I can't answer that.

I think it's speculation.

I mean, I don't know.
Q.

Well, then —

A.

I assumed that I didn't have any —

equity in the

joint venture because I hadn't provided financing yet for the
project.

Okay?

I didn't have —

So, no, I didn't have, it's my understanding
I wasn't pari: of the joint venture at the

time.
Q.

What was your deal if you were able to put

together financing, what would you have received for that?
A.

Approximately 25 percent equity in the project.

Q.

And was there something in writing that was

provided to you that said that?
A.

I don't recall.

I don't have documentation to

that effect.
Q.

Let's return to Exhibit 1 for a minute.

It's the
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1

seen documentation to that effect.

What you showed me was an

2

exhibit of Moab Land Development Joint Venture's, and the

3

first time I saw that was when the Complaint came in.

4

no knowledge of this document or these people, until that

5

time.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

A.

Yes, sir.

8 :

Q.

—

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

What did that mean?

11

A.

That we're a lender, provide funding for the

12

project.

13

percent of the borrowers' equity.

14

borrowing entity until the principal is reduced by 50

15

percent.

16

principal of the loan was reduced to 50 percent of the

17

original amount, or 3.5 million, at which time the equity

18

would drop to 10 percent to the lender.

19
20
21
22

Q.

—

at the bottom is equity?

1

It was assumed that they would have to give up 40
It says 40 percent in the

So they would have to give 40 percent until the

That would be, for example, the bank or wherever

the funds came from?
A.

Whoever it was.

And then going down to the next

page —

J

23

Q.

Uh-huh.

24

A.

—

25

On page 1 of the service agreement

I had

after WEA fee it says:

Or any such terms and

conditions that are mutually agreeable to borrower, the
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13

Right.

A.

1

Okay.

2
A.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

We have Robert Jr. is the general manager.

Robert Jr./'our son, is the general manager.

He

does the day-to-day detail work and makes all those
decisions.
Q.

Do you own any other businesses?

A.

No.

Q.

Whose idea was it to establish the

waterpark business?

11

A.

Our family.

12

Q.

I'd like to turn our attention then to the

13

events that bring us to this case.

14

to the Holiday Inn Express project that was involved

15

in this case, I'll refer to it as the Moab Holiday

16

inn project just so we're on common ground.

17

did the idea for a Holiday Inn come from?

18

A.

And when I refer

Where

We discussed it and we went to Spanish Fork

19

and saw a Holiday Inn Express there, and made our

20

approach originally with Duane Barney, who was

21

running the Holiday Inn Express there.

22

we got started.

23
24
25

Q.

That's how

What led you to come up with that idea in

your family for that business?
A,

Well, Holiday Inn, I've stayed in Holiday

14

Inns, and they have a procedure of allowing kids to
come into the Holiday Inn, and so it just played in
1 well with development of a waterpark, hand in hand.

'/

Q.

1

When did you go to Spanish Fork to speak
with Mr . Barney?
A.

It was approximately in 1992-

I don't know

the exact date.
Q.

Do you remember the season?

Was it winter?

A.

Well, it's when I first met Duane Barney.

Q.

How did you learn that Mr. Barney was

running the Holiday Inn in Spanish Fork?

J

A.

He showed me his business card.

1

Q.

And when was that?

Or let me clarify, when J

was the first time you met Mr. Barney?
A.

I'd say in 1992.

Q.

And what did you discuss at that first

1 meeting with Mr. Barney?
A.

He said he could help us.

J

I
J

He had the

contacts , and he had put together a proposal to

I
J

begin wi,.th on a new Holiday Inn Express there, and
he couldI do the same thing for us, he and his

J

associates.

J

Q.

Did he say who his associates were?

1

A.

At the first meeting I don't recall.

1

Q.

Was this meeting in person?

J

16

A,

I don't recall.

I don f t remember.

Nothing

was taking place, except that he was going to come
J down here.

Q.

1

So 'you sat a time and a date for him to

J come down to Moab?
A.

I

Well, it was imminent shortly after our

meeting he was coming down.
Q.

J
1

As we've discussed this meeting, has it

refresheid your recollection about what time of the
year in 1992 it would have taken place?
A.

I would think it was early.

1 I f m just. guessing at those years.

I

Early in 1992. I

I think '92 was

J

But it was the

J

first contact we had before we did anything else.

J

the year1 I met with Duane Barney.

Q.

When did you first meet Greg Page?

1

A.

He came down with Duane Barney.

J

Q.

So would that have been the next meeting?

J

A.

The next meeting, yes.

1

Q.

With those gentlemen was when they came

J

down to Moab?

A.

Right.

J

Q.

And when was that?

I

A.

I don't know.

I

Soon after the meeting?

I

Soon after, yes.

|

Q

*

A.
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Q.

Within a month?

A.

I would think so,

Q.

Who was present at that meeting besides

Barney, Pag-^ and yourself?
A.

I think Mr. Lanto.

Mr. Pete Lanto.

Q.

Anybody else?

A.

I don f t recall at that point, no.

Q.

What did you discuss at that meeting?

A.

The framework of a partnership.

Q.

You discussed forming a partnership?

A.

Right.

Q.

And do you recall what the details of that

partnership were as discussed at that meeting?
A.

That we would b e — w e would have an interest

in the partnership.

In our partnership.

MR. RUSSELL:

Are you finished?

Are you

finished with your answer?
THE WITNESS:
Q.

(BY MR. HOWE)

Yeah.

That's it.

I'm sorry.

I looked like

you were deep in thought still.
A.

I was trying to think.

Q.

So the meeting in Moab then that we've just

discussed, was the first time you met Mr. Lanto?
A.

Right.

Q.

And how did he fit in the picture?

13
A,

He was going to be the builder.

Q.

Was he someone then that Page and Barney

brought down?
A.

Right.

They brought in as the builder.

Q.

Do you recall him discussing his experience

as a builder or his qualifications?
A.

He asked about t h e — I .told him we had a

topography map that we had flown, and I could pile
up some--he asked if I could put some profiles
together, detailed profiles, for him to base his
site study.

And so—which I did.

I made a series

of cross-sections across the property we 1 re talking
about, mailed it to him.
Q.

Mailed it to him after this meeting?

A.

Right.

Q.

Do you know someone by the name of Eric

Rasmussen?
A.

Duane Barney—I mean Greg Page mentioned

Eric Rasmussen, and that he was his—Greg Page's
brother-in-law.

Fqr some reason he was going to be

on the thing instead of Greg Page.

And as far as

I'm concerned, I didn't know what the reason was.
Q.

When you say on the thing, you mean what?

A.

On the contract.

Q.

But you don't know why?

On our agreement.

19
A.

I don f t know why.

He didn't—he just said

he just was a trustworthy individual, his
brother-in-law.
Q.

Is 'there anything else you can recall about

that meeting in Moab that we've just discussed?
A-

They were going to send the agreement back

to us, which we looked at.
Q.

Who proposed the idea of entering into an

agreement?
A.

Well, Greg Page and—had to get it in

writing.
Q.

Have you ever engaged in any business,

other business, with any of these gentlemen, Barney,
Page, Lanto, other than this?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.
(Exhibit No. 13 marked.)

Q.

(BY MR. HOWE)

Handing you what's been

marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 13.
A.

What does that say?
MR. RUSSELL:

It says topography map,

roadway feasibility, signs and code it looks like.
Let him ask a question.
THE WITNESS:
sorry.

What was your question?

I'm

27
this agreement?
A.

I believe that's right.

Q.

Will you turn with me to the signature page

again.

''

A.

Okay.

Q.

Did these individuals here reflected on the

signature page, represent all of the members of the
joint venture?
A.

I never thought about it, but I f m sure it

must have been.

to.

MR. RUSSELL:

Can you read who they are?

THE WITNESS:

Yes, I can read them.

MR. RUSSELL:

All right.

You don't have

I just want to make sure you can.
Q.

(BY MR. HOWE)

Were there any other

agreements that you entered into besides this one?
A.

I don't remember.

Q.

You don't recall?

A.

I don't recall.

Q.

On Schedule A of this agreement it sets

forth the percentages and contributions.
A.

Right.

That's Schedule A.

Q.

Schedule A.

Excuse me.

Do you recall what the

expertise and consideration was to be for Mr. Barney
and Mr. Rasmussen on behalf of Mr. Page?

2a
A.

No.

I don't recall.

Q.

Did they tell you at the time this

agreement was signed, what that expertise and
consideration was going to be?
A.

No.

I'm sorry, I didn't get that

information.
Q.

Will you turn with me to the front page of

the document, please.

Looking down at paragraph 1.7

there on the bottom, additional joint venturers.
A.

Okay.

Q.

Have you had a chance it read that?

A.

Additional joint venturers may, that's all

I can see.
MR. RUSSELL:

Says, "Additional joint

venturers may be added to the joint venture at any
time upon agreement of all of the then-existing
joint venturers."
THE WITNESS:
Q.

(BY MR. HOWE)

That's right.

I see that.

Do you recall reading that

provision when you entered into this agreement?
A.

I'm sure I read it, but I don't recall the

details of that.
Q.

Did you ever give your consent for any

other individual to become a member of the joint
venture agreement?

29

A.

They never asked me.

Q.

So is your answer no?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Thank you.

No.

The answer is no.

(Exhibit No. 14 marked. )
Q.

(BY MR. HOWE)

marked as Exhibit 14.

Handing you what' s been
I'll ask you if yo u recognize

1 that document?
A.

No, I don't.

Q-

I'll represent to you that this was

produced as part of your document product ion in
response to Norman Larsen's request, and that you
produced the document.

You say you don't recognize

the document?
A.

No.

Q.

There at the bottom references a

development of the balance cf 5.3 acres which
includes the water well.

Is that the lar ger portion

that you had referenced* earlier?
A.

That's right.

Yes.

Q.

Was that to entail a development of the

water well?
A.

Well, we didn't talk about devel opment.

didn't talk about any development.
Q.

Okay.

We

61
1 I
2

MR. RUSSELL:

That's been asked and

answered twice.

3

THE WITNESS:

4

be the same I was referring to.

5

Q.

That's right.

(BY MR. HOWE)

Yes.

It would

That last sentence there,

6

I'm looking again at Exhibit 19 regarding the buyout

7

of Mr. Pete Lanto' position in the proposed project,

•8

what was your understanding as of December 6th or

9

7th, 1995, regarding a buyout?

10

A.

I don't know how it was going to work.

11

Q.

When was the first time you heard about a

12
13

buyout or a possible buyout of Mr. Lanto 1 position?
A.

I don't recall.

I don't know how I got

14

this, made this statement hejre.

15

basis for it right now.

16 J someplace.
17
18

I don't know the

But I must have heard it

But I couldn't—or I wouldn't have said

that.
Q.

Could the basis for this statement have

19 I come from your telephone conversation with Mr. Page
20
21
22
23
24
25

on or about December 6 or 7, 1995?
A.

I would assume so.

That was our principal

contact.
Q.

Mr. Page was your principal contact, is

that what you mean?
A.

At that time, yes.
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deposition, of course, so you can do whatever you
want.

But it may be more productive to go through

the sequence with Diane and then fill in gaps or
other questions with Bob, because I don't think
we're accomplishing very much right now.
MR. HOWE:

I'll do that.

I want to make

sure I get his impressions on the documents, and
just if he doesn't remember meetings in the interim,
that's fine.
MR. RUSSELL:
Q.

Okay.

(BY MR. HOWE)

Handing you what has been

previously marked as Deposition Exhibit —
MR. RUSSELL:
Q.

Nine.

(BY MR. HOWE)

— 9 , and ask you to take a

look at that and tell me if you recognize it?
MR. RUSSELL:

This is a letter dated May 9,

1996 from Norman Larson to you, regarding the joint
venture — a

joint venture proposal for the

development of a franchise motel and refinancing of
the waterpark located in Moab, Utah.
THE WITNESS:
Q.

I remember the letter, yes.

(BY MR. HOWE)

You recall seeing the

letter?
A.

Yes.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did you respond to the letter?

90
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Why didn't you respond to that letter?

A.

What we're talking about a partner, joint

venture partner, no reference in this letter here to
our joint venture partnership.

And sticking to the

subject of our partnership, it sounds like it was
going off on a tangent somewhere.
make any sense to me.

It just didn't

This proposal, it doesn't

even fit our agreement that we have in joint
venture, operating agreement.

We have all our rules

about the joint venture, we're supposed to notify
each other and keep each other informed, and this is
off on a tangent of everything that our agreement
calls for, as far as I can tell.

And I just didn't

think it was relevant to even answer it.

Too

farfetched as far as I was concerned.
Q.

Did the proposal seem—aside from whether

it would be against the spirit of any partnership,
did the proposal seem sound to you?
A.

What?

Q.

Did the proposal seem sound to you, to your

recollection?
A.
of it.

I didn't pay much attention to that aspect
I just rejected and didn't see any need of

pursuing it.

I didn't even answer at the time.

